Receiving the Eucharist, Writing the Gift: Anglo-Catholic Epistemology for Secular Anthropology

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In this article I address anthropology’s secular underpinnings by presenting the discipline’s epistemology as antithetical to that of Catholic Christianity. I consider this opposition through the lens of an Anglo-Catholic student chaplaincy in Oxford, England. Anglo-Catholics are members of the Church of England who desire to restore Catholic sacramentality to Protestantism, particularly through a theology of the Eucharist in which Christ inhabits and transforms material elements. Anglo-Catholic Eucharistic theology exemplifies an epistemology based on attachment and obligation between the human recipient and God as the giver of revelation. In offering an ethnographic account of Anglo-Catholic Eucharistic theology, I consider how a theory of knowledge based on gift exchange may remedy anthropology’s struggle to comprehend and convey a level of difference in religious lives beyond the social register.

Introduction: ‘The Spirit is in you, inside you.’

It is both the blessing and the curse of the anthropologist “studying up” (Nader 1974) that her informants are wont to beat her to the analytical punch. It is the enduring challenge of the anthropologist studying Christians that her informants will appropriate her secular project for their transcendent goals. When these two fieldwork challenges happen in the same moment, it behooves the anthropologist to reconsider not just her analysis of the event, but the grounding premises by which she approaches the world of her interlocutors. Moll (2018, 256-7) has argued that when anthropologists contest analytically what religious subjects debate normatively, they risk occluding both the product and process of an epistemological labor that bears significantly on their informants’ lives and may potentially bear on the anthropological project itself. It is the aim of this article to consider a possible response to Moll’s plaint by engaging with Christian subjects as both ethnographic actors and analytical interlocutors. What if, I ask, anthropologists of Christianity allowed their informants to shape not only what the discipline knows about human religious life, but to shape what the discipline considers religious and ethnographic knowledge to be?

I conducted ethnographic fieldwork¹ at Bouverie House,² a chaplaincy and study center that serves the University of Oxford in England. My interlocutors were priests, professors and students of the highest academic pedigree. Their scholastic pursuits were myriad; their theology was Catholic—“according to the whole.” Bouverie House is Anglo-Catholic, which is best understood as a “discursive tradition” (Asad 2009b) whose adherents have, since a period during the 19th century known as the Oxford Movement, sought to restore a Catholic theology of sacramentality to the Church of England (CoE, Anglican Church). Sacraments are material signs of

¹This research was conducted in conformance with the ethical standards of the Association of Social Anthropologists. I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers whose comments have helped me develop the ideas presented in this paper.

²A pseudonym. All interlocutors are referred to by pseudonym and may be further anonymized by creation of composite characters.
divine presence" held exclusively by the Church\textsuperscript{1} as a transcendent institution, and give shape to a semiotic system that links immanent and transcendent spheres. The Anglo-Catholic argument for sacramentality takes shape through commitment to the necessity of the Eucharistic ritual (communion), and a rejection of naturalism and historical rationalism in theological studies. Following Anglo-Catholicism’s core aims, the mission of Bouverie House is to promote theological study alongside “holiness of life.” Its founders and contemporary members recognize the House as a place of “sacred learning,” where worship and scholarship are rightly reunited in remedy of the rampant “decay of faith” that plagues the surrounding city and university. The chaplaincy attends to students and faculty of the university who are struggling to negotiate their religious commitments in a secular academic space. Arriving at the chaplaincy to conduct ethnographic fieldwork, I presented myself as a researcher who was sympathetic (practicing Christian) but external (not British, Anglican, or Oxonian). Ignoring my attempted detachment, my interlocutors positioned me as a Christian graduate student trying to make sense of her faith while entrenched in a famously anti-Christian discipline—precisely the sort of person to whom they would minister.

Once, in a bout of fieldwork frustration, I expressed to an informant that I doubted my ability to capture in writing the depth of experiences, conflicts and commitments of those I studied. Julian was also a doctoral candidate, sympathetic but on the whole unimpressed by my complaint; she seemed to discern a lack of faith on my part, or perhaps prideful thinking that I had full control over what I wrote. Julian looked me straight in the eyes and replied matter-of-factly, “If you’re baptized, the Spirit is in you, inside you.” She told me that even if I wanted to write a methodologically secular ethnographic account, it would be impossible, because God was already present. “Carolyn,” she sighed, “you go to mass every day. You know what the Eucharist is about; it’ll come through in your writing. Maybe not everyone will see it, but the people who need to will find it there.” The young woman paused, pursed her lips in a half-smile. “Let those who have ears, hear,” right?"

The concern I had expressed was a general one, perhaps even stereotypical to the ethnographic field-worker: can a few hundred pages of printed text convey the tremendous richness of real human lives? My interlocutor’s response, however, was specific in discerning my particular anthropological dilemma, answering a question I had not asked: can a secular discipline communicate the supernatural, spiritual gravitas to which one’s religious subjects commit their lives? Julian immediately conflated the entirety of the Anglo-Catholic experience with the moment of the Eucharist. My ability to write well about these Christians was contingent not only on my relationship with those I studied, but particularly on my baptism and the fact that I attended mass at the chaplaincy every day. Julian was confident that my ethnographic account would convey something true about the Anglo-Catholics at Bouverie House, because the Holy Spirit was working in me through my baptism and, more pointedly, through Christ’s presence which I ingested every morning when I received the Eucharistic host. For Julian and her Anglo-Catholic peers at the chaplaincy, the Eucharist is the ultimate source of revelation because the bread and wine consecrated on the altar manifest Christ to those who receive and consume. Christ is Logos, the physical embodiment of all wisdom, and so to receive the Eucharist is to receive knowledge—and to consume is to be transformed, to grow more like the divine source of knowledge.

It is the chief contention of this article that Catholic theology—the pursuit of knowledge about God—functions within a different episteme to that of anthropology—the study of humans. Julian described a kind of knowledge that is a gift existing only within (or as) a relationship between would-be knower and object of knowledge. Anything I had learned about the Anglo-Catholics at Bouverie House was contingent on my relationship and commitment to God, and the reception of His presence in the Eucharist. This is a dual-faceted point: I could write well about my interlocutors because I was baptized and had the Holy

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\textsuperscript{1} The seven sacraments of the Church are: baptism, confirmation, holy orders (priesthood), marriage, unction (anointing of the ill), confession, and the Eucharist (communion).

\textsuperscript{2} “Church” refers to the trans-spatial and transtemporal body of Christians, particularly in adherence to Catholic (universal) teaching, ritual and dogma that constitutes “tradition.”

\textsuperscript{3} A phrase used by Jesus in the gospels (Matthew 11:15, 13:9 and 13:43; Mark 4:9; Luke 8:8 and 14:35).
Spirit inside me, but that ability was sustained on the premise of dedicated commitment to a specific relational field. It is no small matter that, by Julian’s assessment, if I disengaged from the vertical (human-divine) relationship, I might well lose the horizontal (human social) knowledge which I sought. According to this epistemology, reception of sacramental knowledge is inextricable from one’s engagement with and transformation by a certain kind of relationship based on production of likeness; the anthropologist is able to process theological “data” by virtue of having ingested it and attached herself to its source. Paralleling this Eucharistic theology, the anthropological episteme certainly considers the production of social knowledge to be contingent on relationship—is that not the very premise of ethnographic fieldwork? But the relationship is fundamentally one of horizontal (and ultimately incommensurable) difference—between those studied, between researcher and subject, between self and other (cf. Furani 2019; Abu-Lughod 1991). Failure to recognize these contrasting claims about knowledge on horizontal and vertical axes is, I argue, a major blockage for anthropologists who seek to understand Christians—their lives, their theologies, and their God.

In this paper, I present Anglo-Catholic Eucharistic theology as an epistemology that is not easily conceivable within—in fact actively challenges—the differential analytical framework that grounds a secular contemporary anthropology. Below, I outline a brief history of the rich and volatile relationship between the Anglo-Catholic tradition and the British academy. I proffer the Anglo-Catholic approach to knowledge as anti-rational, affective and relational. This epistemology takes shape through a sacramental theology of the Eucharist, in which knowledge of God is received as a gift that must be reciprocated by transformation in relationship. I then consider the implications of this epistemology for anthropology, a discipline whose historical links to Enlightenment-era rationalism have sustained a methodology of detachment and an emphasis on lateral cultural difference that limits the discipline’s understanding of religious knowledge premised on vertical (divine-human) attachment. Here, I refer to Furani’s (2019) dichotomous Cartesian and Augustinian epistemological frames; heuristics for “secular” and “theological” ways of knowing. Because knowledge is understood by Anglo-Catholics to be a sustained conjuncture rather than object, it is necessary to position my ethnographic subjects as interlocutors who continue to interject, correct, affect and create (my) anthropological analysis in their own right long after the field is left behind. I therefore conclude this article with consideration of how an Anglo-Catholic epistemology based on attachment and reciprocity might serve anthropologists studying Christianity in deepening their understanding of their subjects’ life worlds.

My interlocutors negotiate the secular academy primarily as a non- or anti-religious space. However, my own contention that anthropology is a secular discipline does not imply anti-religious sentiment per se, but rather refers to a Cartesian detachment of the researcher’s self from the object of study and a focus on human difference; it is secular in the sense of a differentiating process that may result in the occlusion of religious knowledge. I draw on Hirschkind’s (2011, 641) description of the secular as a “relational dynamic” based on oppositions (comparison afforded by intrinsic difference), and Casanova’s (1994) simple definition of the secular as a process of differentiation between categories. Casanova (2006, 19) rejects ossification of the secular as identity or object (cf. Cannell 2010), instead employing the concept as “an analytical framework for a comparative research agenda.” Links between anthropology and secularism have been widely documented; I argue specifically that anthropology is secular on an epistemological register (c.f. Asad 2009a; Furani 2018, 2019; Gellner 2001; Kapferer 2001; Lambek 2012; Mahmood 2008). By maintaining critical distance and difference from its religious subjects, a secular anthropology fails to comprehend a degree of that religious knowledge which has the power to transform its recipients.

The Secular Academy and its Anglo-Catholic Critics

I will return to Julian’s sacramental commentary in due course. First, however, it is necessary to situate her claim within the broader discourse of her tradition; clarification of the historical links between Anglo-Catholicism and the British academy will demonstrate the productivity of considering an Anglo-Catholic epistemological critique of anthropology. It is not an arbitrary claim of mine that Anglo-Catholics have something valuable to say about public scholarship. The tradition was gestated by priest-scholars of the University of Oxford, and the shape of contemporary British higher education is in large part a product of the cataclysmic Oxford Movement.
Anglo-Catholicism is a tradition in the sense of its members sustaining a “discourse” (Asad 2009b) or “argument” (MacIntyre 2011, 257) about themselves and their world over time. The chief contention of Anglo-Catholicism is that the Church of England is rightly part of the universal Catholic Church; therefore its members have equal access to divine grace conveyed through the sacraments, and to divine revelation held by the Church as truth authority (cf. Bandak and Boylston 2014) and mediating presence between God and humans (cf. Engelke 2007). The argument is one against the exclusivity of the Roman Catholic Church, but more importantly is an attempted remediation of perceived secularization within Anglicanism (cf. Coleman 2020). The Anglo-Catholic accusation is that the CoE is secular(izing), which sources to conflicting theologies of the sacraments. According to Catholic sacramental theology, to which Anglo-Catholics adhere, the sacraments are material instantiations of divine spiritual presence; Christ is present in the bread and wine. The Anglican Church doctrinally affirms real divine presence, but emphasizes the spiritual transformation of communicants by their actions rather than the materials—that is, it is not Christ’s actual body or blood that is consumed. Per Keane (2006; cf. Mahmood 2009, 66; McDannell 2011), Protestantism has historically enforced a purifying differentiation between sign and signified, substance and meaning. Anglo-Catholics reject this purificatory theology because the detachment of immanent and transcendent frames equates to a secular process of differentiation, as introduced above. It is the physical consumption of the Eucharistic elements—material attachment—that provides divine revelation to Anglo-Catholic recipients. Sacramentality is the antithesis of the secular.

This sacramentally-tinged discourse took force in 19th century Oxford, when a contingent of theologians and Biblical scholars—all ordained Anglican clergy—fought against the decline of tradition in their Church, and the decline of properly committed theological scholarship in their academy. Their ecclesiastical concern was prompted by certain Parliamentary measures to rearrange or eliminate the Church’s bishoprics in response to a general shift in the country’s ecclesiastical forms, specifically the emergence of evangelical Anglican and non-Anglican Protestant movements that pitted the freedom and duty of individuals against the state church’s rigid hierarchical structure (cf. Brown 2009). Traditionalists feared that changes to the authoritative role of bishops would result in the entropy of the hierarchical structure of the Church and, in turn, its sacramental authority. I gloss this point, but it is important to hold in mind because the sacrament of the Eucharist is a particularly potent source of divine knowledge for Anglo-Catholics—loss of sacramentality to symbology, or spirituality without material presence, is loss of Logos, loss of incarnate knowledge.

Fitting to their concerns about access to divine knowledge, the first Anglo-Catholics (founders of the Oxford Movement) were fellows of the University of Oxford, who perceived shades of post-Enlightenment rationalism in their academic milieu as well as in their Church. At the time, the university was formally affiliated with the CoE; students avowed the 39 Articles of Faith of the Anglican Church upon matriculation, and faculty fellowship was contingent on ordination as a clergyman of the state church. The university was a de facto Anglican seminary and the nation’s chief forum for the development and dissemination of British theology (Rowell 1991, 2).

The Oxford Movement overlaps chronologically with major reforms of British university structure. The reforms were based on the increasingly popular German Humboldtian model, and sought to broaden universities’ population and deepen their intellectual rigor. Links between the state church and the University of Oxford were severed; Anglican affiliation was no longer required of students, and ordination ceased to be a condition for college fellowship.

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1 Anglo-Catholics at Bouverie House are hesitant to explicate their Eucharistic theology, but it may be understood as consubstantiation: the consecrated elements are Christ’s real body and blood, and also remain bread and wine.

2 The Catholic Church has exclusive right and duty to provide the sacraments. Priests are charged to instantiate the sacraments because they are ordained into the divine lineage of Apostolic Succession—priests are ordained by bishops, whose authority traces back to Christ conferring his ministry to his disciples. Thus, sacramentality and priesthood are co-extant for Anglo-Catholics; a conception of priesthood based on moral/teaching authority, rather than ritual/sacramental (characteristic of Protestantism, per Keane 2006, 62), would result in the loss of the sacramental value of the Eucharist, and thus the unique revelatory potential of the Church.
Theology, Latin, and Greek were made optional courses as strict disciplinary divisions were established (Goldman 2004, 382). The impetus for these reforms was an explicit reaction against Anglo-Catholicism (Brock 2000, 14, Brockliss 2016, 224). The Oxford Movement had gained fervor and considerable influence within the university; but so too did the movement gain enemies, who rejected traditionalism as archaic, legalistic, and close-minded (Liddon 1894). University reform was supported by evangelical Anglicans and other Protestant denominations who opposed the rigidity of institutionalized and ritual-centric religion (Hinchliff 2000, 98), and feared widespread conversion to Roman Catholicism (Brockliss 2016, 349). In short, the British university as we know it today—diverse in population, differentiated in subject-matter, divergent in scholastic teleology—is very much a product of a specific moment in time, a particular movement in British ecclesiology, academy, and society. 

19th century Oxonian Anglo-Catholics fought passionately against the university reforms, declaring the new educational model to be dangerously secular, both because it restricted the role of the Church in academic pursuits, and because the model was premised on a process of differentiation between fields of study and between scholars and their objects of study. John Henry Newman, a leader of the Oxford Movement who later confirmed rampant fears that Oxford was a bridge over the Tiber, attacked parliamentary proceedings with his 1852 lectures on *The Idea of a University*. Newman argued that limiting the place of theology in higher academia would create false divisions between fields of study and irresponsibly grant intellectual and ideological power to individuals rather than valuing institutional cohesiveness (1859, 50f, 14). The university was for Newman a reflection of the Church; many members, but one body. Edward Pusey, peer of Newman and effective leader of the Oxford Movement after Newman’s conversion, feared that the reforms would turn Oxford into a “godless” academy (Goldman 2004, 386). Newman and Pusey considered the purpose of universities to shape moral persons, not merely academics, and they predicted that society and scholarship would both suffer for the reforms (Liddon 1894). Namely, they feared a decline in general theological understanding amongst the populace by virtue of ill-equipped clerics, the erosion of the Church of England’s public sway, a shift toward individualism in scholastic pursuits, and most critically, a loss of teleology in both worship and academic practices. For Anglo-Catholics, then as now, academic scholarship has its rightful place within the work of the Church toward greater knowledge of God; insofar as all knowledge is ultimately theological, division of disciplines is for Anglo-Catholics tantamount to a fundamental misunderstanding of academic pursuit. Christ is given in the Eucharist as the Logos, the central ordering principle of all knowledge (cf. Bialecki and Hoenes del Pinal 2011). By ingesting divine wisdom, one’s scholastic endeavors—even non-theological—become teleologically linked to pursuit of divine revelation.

Concern on the part of first-generation Anglo-Catholics regarding Britain’s adoption of the German university model was closely linked to their concern regarding German theology, which during the 19th century was characterized by historical exegesis and the rationalization of miraculous Scriptural events. Paralleling Keane’s Protestant purification, here the Bible’s material form—like that of the sacraments—was divested from its spiritual implications. This new critical hermeneutics took hold in English theology in accordance with a broader trend in the academy toward “scientific detachment” of researcher from object of study; one’s ability to know depended on a critical distance from that which would be known (Candea, et al. 2015, 3-5). Pusey (1878) scorned critical rationalist theology as “science”—the heedless application of scientific principles to non-scientific questions in search of quantifiable (natural, perceivable) evidence—and mourned the resultant transformation of Scripture into a work of human “artistry” and an “object” of speculative inquiry (Asad 2003, 37) that, by virtue of scholastic detachment, could be profitably studied regardless of the reader’s personal commitment to the text. Anglo-Catholics fought for an anti-rationalist theology, arguing that the revelation recorded in Scripture and provided by the Church through sacraments is ultimately mysterious, and that knowledge of the divine is accessible not by so much

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1 Shaffer (1975, 10, 12) describes a certain “modernity” of thought within the German school, in which the Biblical text was “liberated” from its prior divine source (and from the Church’s authority on revelation, cf. Meier 1977, 14), now subject to scientific inquiry.
diligent logic-work, but by cultivation of a submissive relationship to God through devotion to prayer, worship, and engagement with the sacraments (cf. Larsen 2017). Bemoaning the state of Christianity in England, Pusey (1833) wrote that the Church’s “own Ordinances afford the means of her restoration.” The Church bears the truths that transform the world; those truths are preserved by adherence to traditional dogma and praxis. Thus the Anglo-Catholic must pray more, read more Scripture, fast and tithe more, go more often to mass. Remedy comes particularly through dedication to the sacraments. The Eucharist typifies the ideal approach to theological knowledge, mingling as it does natural material forms with mysterious divine spiritual presence that can be literally ingested to attach recipients to the source of knowledge, transforming their own material forms with the Logos.

The Eucharist as Knowledge, as Gift

Given that sacramentality is a defining feature of Anglo-Catholicism, it is a frequent topic of conversation amongst members of Bouverie House, who often describe their uniqueness within the Church of England according to their Eucharistic theology. Peter was an ordinand, serving at Bouverie House while training for the priesthood. He had been raised between a non-denominational and an Evangelical Anglican church, and had over his teenage and young adult years gradually discerned a vocation to the priesthood within the Catholic tradition. While finding many merits in his Evangelical roots, he was quick to point out a fundamental lacking in those churches’ worship practices and theology, particularly evident during communion. He described that at his home church, the ritual was symbolic; the actions at the altar were a memorialization of something that had been done two thousand years ago, and the purpose was to remind participants that their community was the spiritual reflection of Jesus’ actions with the bread and wine. “It was showing physically your fellowship with the Body of Christ, with those around you,” the ordinand explained. “There was this notion that because we all have the Holy Spirit, we are the Body of Christ, we as people are the most important things in the room. And that was true there,” he mused. “But now [at Bouverie House], it’s more, because we’re consuming Christ himself.” Following his Anglo-Catholic forebears, Peter distinguished mainstream Anglican (and broader Protestant) communion as symbolic but not sacramental in the Catholic semiotic sense because its practitioners do not recognize Christ’s material presence. He described that the Eucharist unites the Church with God and transforms its members because of the “fulness with Christ being present in the host.”

Peter’s description ought not be taken as a besmirching of non-Catholic traditions, though considering Anglo-Catholicism’s ongoing contentions with the Church of England, his may be a corrective stance. Certainly, Anglo-Catholics honor the communal aspect of the Eucharist emphasized by the wider Protestant tradition. The repetition of physical actions unites participants, and links them to previous practitioners of those actions, tracing back to Christ. Peter likewise affirms the importance of the Holy Spirit in the collective membership. What makes the sacrament “more” valuable than symbolic or spiritual representation is that it physically attaches Christ to the recipient through the material elements of the ritual. Christ is literally ingested by the participant, and by that reception and consumption the human actor is imbued with Logos, divine wisdom.

The sacrament of the Eucharist is clearly powerful in Peter’s conception, but the ordinand’s words themselves are vague. The Eucharist is “more,” he said—more what? And the “fulness” he described—what is that filling content? It is worth dwelling on this vagueness, because the lack of descriptive quality reveals something of the Anglo-Catholic epistemological process. The imprecision of Peter’s language is a statement about the impossibility of describing the Eucharist in any straightforward way; what is happening is beyond the bounds of rational knowledge. The semiotic potency of the Eucharist transforms the Anglo-Catholic understanding of theological knowledge so that one knows God only insofar as one attaches to Him—and, in the case of the Eucharist, only insofar as one receives rather than takes, is acted upon rather than acting oneself.

Peter was normally a vivacious and dramatic personality. He bore a stigmata and laughingly described himself as a “rosary rattler;” he was fond of relaying strange saintly miracles and tales of gruesome martyrdoms; once when ill, he slept with a crucifix on his chest so that if he died at night, he would be found looking particularly pious. When I asked the young man how he recognized God’s presence, I was expecting a bit of thrill. “There are moments when you’re slapped in the face by the Lord and He tells you He’s there, these very blunt, punch-in-the-gut moments.” Peter described his baptism as one such
moment, as well as a time when he visited a monastery on a pilgrimage. He recalled these moments to me with humor, drama, vivid description. But then he looked away, stared past me into space. “You know, sometimes He’s the earthquake, wind and fire, and sometimes He’s the still, small voice of calm.” The sacrament of the Holy Altar is that still, small voice.”

Peter’s affective, non-rational explanation of the Eucharist is echoed by other members of the chaplaincy. One student told me that he often felt a shiver run down his spine during the Eucharistic Prayer. A priest described offering communion “propped up on the edge of a bed in a very busy hospital”; even in that chaotic, overstimulating and emotionally-charged environment, he found that while saying the prayers, “the place fall[s] away”, leaving him “awe-struck” at the sacrifice and “completely given over” to the moment. Another student echoed Peter in marking the unique experience of the Eucharist at Bouverie House. “I feel happy singing a worship song,” she told me, explaining her occasional visits to a nearby charismatic Evangelical church. “But the liturgy of the Eucharist is much more tangible. It’s sucking on the end of a pen, that sort of iron taste. It’s hitting the right note, a sudden shifting in quality, a shiver run down his spine during the Eucharistic Prayer. I feel happy singing a worship song,” she told me, explaining her occasional visits to a nearby charismatic Evangelical church. “But the liturgy of the Eucharist is much more tangible. It’s sucking on the end of a pen, that sort of iron taste. It’s hitting the right note, a sudden shifting in quality, incredibly calming and incredibly glorious.” Rather than attempting to understand what, precisely, is going on in these “tangible” encounters with God, I want to consider Anglo-Catholic descriptions of the ineffable. Put another way, what matters here is how, not what, Anglo-Catholics think about revelation.

Each of these descriptions—a sense of calm, a shiver, a loss of orientation, the iron taste of a pen nib—connect divine revelation (recognition of God’s presence) to a change in physical state. Orsi, in his (2011, 93) description of “the holy,” rejects any claim that religious experience 1) can be explained in the purely rational terms of the post-Enlightenment science described above, or 2) is condensable into a Romantic emotional reaction against that detached rationalism. Instead, the holy is a third way-of-knowing. Orsi draws on Rudolph Otto’s seminal The Idea of the Holy, in which the “feelings” experienced in relation to the holy are not like normal human emotions; rather, the experience is “what Abraham felt in the hands of the living God . . . It [is] to feel oneself ‘dust and ashes’ or as ‘absolute profaneness’” (ibid., 94; cf. Otto 1958, 9). Orsi’s description is a bit elusive, but as with members of Bouverie House, an understanding of holiness is gained from a shifting in quality, from one’s basic and inherent state of being, to a sense of “dust and ashes”—which is not an emotion but a positionality in relation to the thing being known (God). Stepping back from the descriptions themselves—how does one connect a shiver to God?—there is a shared theme equating revelation with a change or transformation of the individual pursuing knowledge relative to (and by the agency of) the object of knowledge. Peter’s calm comes from an external source, not from himself. The knower cannot maintain critical distance from the object to be known because it is the forceful imposition of the object onto the knower by which knowledge so becomes.

Christ’s body and blood are present to Anglo-Catholics alongside the bread and wine of the Eucharist. The Eucharist is a sacrifice, as God gives himself on the altar (Marion 2017, 11). The gift of the sacrament is specifically that of Logos, wisdom incarnate. Christ is knowledge, and so the gift of his presence is the gift of divine knowledge. Catholic theologian Jean-Luc Marion (2016, 6) presents the concept of “givenness,” writing that “a phenomenon only shows itself to the extent that it gives itself.” That is, God is revealed—knowledge made accessible—only by God actually offering himself to Christians through the bread and wine. Marion parallels Mauss in his analysis of sacramental gift exchange; a gift is only such if it is received as well as given (ibid., 117). The Eucharist is a gift because God gives and because people receive.

The gift, of course, requires reciprocation. Mauss’s (2002) tri-part definition of the gift—to give, receive, reciprocate—was based on the Māori concept of hau, the “spirit of things.” Mauss described that “what imposes obligation in the present received and exchanged, is the fact that the thing received is not inactive . . . it is the hau that wishes to return to its birthplace” which is the soul of the original owner (ibid., 15). As a gift, the Eucharist must be recognized not merely as an object conveying expansive meaning, but as a conjuncture—a relationship. And because the Eucharist is a gift of knowledge, the Anglo-Catholic must ask, to whom does this knowledge belong? Or rather, who gave the gift; to whom must a gift be

\[1\] Peter borrows language from 1 Kings 19, in which God passes by Elijah as a strong wind, an earthquake and a fire (v. 11-12), and then finally as “a still small voice” (v. 12, AKJV).
returned? The answer, of course, is God; those who receive revelation must return that gift in the form of personal transformation and commitment to the relational field. The sacrament of the Eucharist expands the bounds of theology for Anglo-Catholics, utterly reshapes what it means to know God and to live accordingly. In turn, the Eucharistic theology of Bouverie House impinges itself on the anthropologist who seeks to know what it means for Anglo-Catholics to know God, so that an ethnographic understanding of Anglo-Catholic religious knowledge may be contingent on the anthropologist engaging in an epistemological gift exchange like that of the Eucharist.

Epistemological Detachment and Attachment

The Eucharistic theology of Anglo-Catholicism does not exist in a vacuum, but functions (at least in part) as a riposte to the secular epistemology that impresses itself upon the congregation of Bouverie House from their Church institution and the surrounding city and university. Anglo-Catholics, uniquely positioned in the history of British academia, have long sought to redeem secular scholarship for their recollective theological project. As Julian declared, reception of divine knowledge through the Eucharist transforms how the recipient negotiates even non-theological knowledge. With this in mind, it is necessary to consider if and how the chaplaincy’s model of knowledge-as-gift speaks beyond their praxis. An Anglo-Catholic epistemology based on a sacramental framework of relational and transformative gift exchange contrasts sharply with that of the secular academy, which is grounded in the detached and differentiating premises of the Enlightenment (Kapferer 2007). For Anglo-Catholics, such knowledge is partial—following Orsi, it is only one of (at least) three ways of knowing. But beyond their critique of secular scholarship’s productive limits, Anglo-Catholics so transformed by their Eucharistic theology recognize that extracting knowledge from relationship is actually dangerous because it dissolves the obligatory commitment of the knower to the object (or subject) of knowledge.

Anglo-Catholics equate knowledge acquisition with attachment to, and transformation by the known. One comes to know God in the Eucharist insofar as Christ (materially, spiritually) enters one’s body. Theological knowledge is not merely information to be collected and recorded, however creative the means. Rather, this knowledge is a gift; not an object but a conjuncture of exchange in which revelation is produced by and reproduces transformative relationship. This sacramental approach to divine revelation is profitably considered within what Furani (2019) describes as an Augustinian epistemology, which he contrasts with a Cartesian approach to knowledge characteristic of anthropology. Furani pitches Descartes’ “I think therefore I am” against (in his own paraphrase) Augustine’s “I am therefore you are in me” (ibid., 14). The Augustinian knowledge framework situates the self as a nexus of relationships, a participatory encounter between human and God by which knowledge of God may be conveyed (Knotts 2020, 99). Augustine’s theology is Neo-Platonic (Cary 2000; C. Harrison 1992), wherein knowledge is the recollection of transcendent and transtemporal truth that is external to human experience (Bloch 1998, 70). Therefore Augustine, as Furani (2019, 119) describes, “immerses in truth in order to know truth, including truths about himself.” An Augustinian epistemology, exemplified by the Eucharistic theology of Bouverie House, sources knowledge as a process of humans attaching themselves, materially and spiritually, to God.

Whereas Augustine conceived of knowledge as fundamentally about attachment, a Cartesian epistemology is dependent on detachment—detaching things from each other and detaching the self from the observed world. Descartes essentially sought to de-mystify revelation by re-locating the nexus of knowledge away from God as an externality, instead situating it within the individual’s mind. Descartes’ theology was derivative of Thomas Aquinas (P. Harrison 2016; Reventlow 2016), who is credited with introducing Aristotelian philosophy to medieval Christianity (Chesterton 2014, 56-7; MacIntyre 2011, 208ff); Descartes might then be said to be an Aristotelian of sorts. Aristotle understood the human mind to be progressively “created” as new knowledge is acquired and used (Bloch 1998, 70). Similarly, in a Cartesian framework, an intrinsic capacity for knowledge production enables humans to grow in understanding of their world (Foucault 2002, 66). Foucault (ibid., 58ff) traces an epistemological shift in the 16th century heralded by Descartes who established knowledge as a process of deductive comparison by differences between intrinsic qualities, rather than seeing things (including the human person and God) as holding a set place in an overall relation to the cosmos which can be discerned or discovered by human knowing. A Cartesian epistemology is
contingent upon detachment of the self (knower) from the world (that to be known) in order to perform categorical differentiation of the perceivable world (ibid., 356, 61). Furani employs this dichotomy to make a claim about anthropology’s chosen epistemology, arguing that the discipline’s Cartesian grounding obstructs its ability to understand religious ways-of-knowing that rely on the attachment of self to the material world and to God.

The Cartesian underpinnings of anthropology can be traced to the discipline’s gestation. It was E. B. Tylor (2010, 2; cf. Lambek 2012; Meneses 2019) who commended early anthropologists to abandon theology, describing it as an “obstacle” to “real knowledge” within the study of human nature. Tylor sought to do away with “extra-natural interference” and begin this new scientific study of culture on the “more practicable ground” of cause and effect (2010, 3, 17). Tylor published this proposition in *Primitive Culture* in 1871. At the time, the aftershock of the Oxford Movement lingered on as a powerful intellectual and social force across Britain, and Anglo-Catholicism remained a considerable presence in Oxford upon Tylor’s first appointment to the University in 1883. Oxford’s traditionalists fought to maintain the integrity of an education system grounded in theology, while they watched theology as they knew it crumble under the weight of new historical critical methods. Envisioning a university beyond its traditional role as a handmaid of the Church, Tylor’s call for a naturalist anthropology (laid out in the first chapter of his magnum opus, 2010, 1-22) was an effort to secure a position for the discipline within the modern differentiated academy, and to wrest scientific pursuit from the grip of irrational religion. Larsen (2014, 27-34), in fact, has recorded that Tylor specifically derided Anglo-Catholic liturgical practice, which he first witnessed in Oxford, as a “survival of sun worship” devoid of “purpose.” His critique was grounded on the premise that Catholic teachings were antithetical to modern science; its rituals and sacraments could be debunked as contrary to the laws of nature. It is not so great a stretch, then, to contemplate that Tylor’s repulsion toward a theological perspective within anthropology was in some part derived from the seismic shifts that the Oxford Movement and its discontents had brought to British academia.

Tylor proposed that anthropology undertake “religious criticism”—interpretation of religion as a “theory of mind” (Saler 2009, 55, 52). Notably, and here mirroring the contemporaneous rise in historical critical methods in theology, the Tylorian anthropologist’s comprehension of a given religion depended on the discernment of its naturalist and historical-geographic sources, and was diametrically opposed to personal religious commitment (cf. Larsen 2014, 20-23). Religion was an object of study for the new human science. Though Tylor’s positivism did not produce anthropology as a natural science, the means to that end—a Cartesian approach to knowledge based on detachment and differentiation—remains at the core of the discipline’s analytical methods, particularly evident in studies of religion. The result is what Meneses (2017) refers to as anthropology’s “unstated teleology” and “implicit ontology”: namely, secularism.

This claim requires some unpacking. Anthropology’s ethnographic process exemplifies a rejection of the core Enlightenment tenant separating researcher from object of knowledge; the ethnographer must participate as well as observe. Adopting Christian language, Furani (2019, 130ff) describes participant observation as a eucharist, with the researcher becoming Taylor’s (2007) “porous” subject, permeated by the forces of alterity in the field. However, in analysis if not ethnographic research, processes of differentiation and detachment undergird anthropology as an academic discipline. This implies neither apathy nor positivist claims to objectivity on the part of the individual anthropologist; analytical detachment is simply the maintenance of a degree of distance and difference between researcher and ethnographic subject in order to convey what Robbins (2013, 334) describes as “the power of otherness.” To go beyond mere description in ethnographic record (cf. Fabian 1993; Engelke 2002), the anthropologist’s task is to laterally compare entities that, while perhaps not stable or bounded units, retain certain qualities that distinguish them from each other and their researchers (Candea 2016, 13). Premised as it is on comparison of lateral difference, the kind of knowledge produced by anthropology is fundamentally Cartesian.

Anthropology’s lateral differentiation overlaps with the more explicitly secular grounding and aims of the modern research university by the shared factor of methodological detachment. For example, in a recent consideration of ethnographic accounts of religious subjects, Carrithers (2015, 170) asserts that valid anthropological scholarship requires authorial detachment, and proposes four markers that create distance between researcher and subject: use of third person plural, qualificatory explanation, right and duty to make an argument regardless of its appeal to one’s
subjects, and a “disinterested” affect. Carrithers claims that detachment is a necessary requisite for one writing as a “scholar” (ibid., 169), rather than, say, as an advocate or ally who strives for “community uplift” (Jacobs-Huey 2002, 798). The argument appears positivist—a disavowal of personal commitment or bias in favor of objective rationalism—but my focus is not on rationalism per se, but the associated value of producing distance between researcher and subject.

Of course, numerous reflexive critiques have been made of Cartesian detachment in anthropological analysis in an effort to reframe ethnographic knowledge as coproduction between researcher and interlocutors. 10 It is significant that Carrithers’ argument is made specifically in consideration of the anthropology of religion; the sustained appeal of detachment in studies of religion reveals anthropology to be fundamentally secular. “Secular” is not a reified state-of-being, but a process of “structural differentiation” (Casanova 2006, 19) between segments of society such as Church and university, and between categorical binaries such as sacred and profane, belief and knowledge, immanence and transcendence (Hirschkind 2011, 642). Exemplifying this definition, Gellner (2001, 339-340) defends a “minimal secularism” in anthropological analysis as means to translate “other systems of thought, including religious systems, for outsiders’ consumption.” Here, religious knowledge is fundamentally “other” to anthropology, and exists as an object that the researcher can manipulate (“translate,” “consume”) by virtue of Cartesian detachment. It is my contention that the appeal of Carrithers’ and Gellner’s methodology sources to an epistemological chasm between anthropology and theology, whereby secular detachment is desirable because it preserves (even “buffers,” à la Taylor 2007) anthropology from a kind of religious knowledge that is fundamentally transformative. The problem with such a secular and detached methodology is that, at least in the Anglo-Catholic context, treating theology as an object for translation or consumption actually effectuates a mistranslation of what theology is; not object but conjuncture, a relationship with God. Emphasizing the relational aspect of theology may result in more apologetics than Gellner would have in his “universal and humanist” science (ibid., 340), but its neglect results in a more serious scholastic error: fundamentally misunderstanding the system of thought that the anthropologist seeks to analyze and convey.

In challenging anthropology’s secular underpinnings, I do not imply that any given system of meaning-making ought to be taken at face-value rather than being more deeply probed. Rather, my proposal is to engage with theological precepts normatively (per Moll 2018), as one would with philosophy, by adopting the epistemology (not the theological claims specifically) of one’s informants. This would enable the anthropologist to treat Christian subjects more seriously as intellectuals (cf. Jenkins 2012, 468; Robbins 2013) and expand the possible questions that can be asked about Christian lives (Robbins 2020, 152). Specifically, engagement with an Anglo-Catholic epistemology, in which knowledge is conjuncture rather than object, affords consideration not only of what certain theologies are or how they are practiced on the ground (e.g. Haynes 2018), but how and why theology transforms its adherents (cf. McKearney 2019). Furani (2019, 183, 85ff) neatly parallels the prophetic critiques of Newman and Pusey, arguing that analytical detachment produces false divisions between fields of knowledge and over-emphasizes horizontal cultural multiplicity in neglect of greater, vertical (divine-human) levels of difference (cf. Dalfert 2018, Robbins 2020). Adoption of an Anglo-Catholic epistemology would address these quandaries. If knowledge is conjuncture rather than object, there need be no boundaries between categories of knowledge. 11 And seeing knowledge of the other as a process of gift exchange positions the giver (the ethnographic subject) in a position of power that unsettles the relativism of lateral difference. Theology

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10 Candea, et al. (2015, 9-11) helpfully track this attempt at ethnographic attachment through a range of 20th century turns in the discipline, from Writing Culture debates to feminist critiques and calls for political engagement. I would add that the Ontological Turn’s emphasis on ethnographic particulars and rejection of sweeping metaphysical claims (e.g. Holbraad and Pedersen 2017, 287) is another recent attempt.

11 Anthropology has always been an inside/outside discipline, situated in the limen of the humanities and sciences (despite Tylor’s efforts); and it has long leveraged this marginality to critique not just its own knowledge practices, but those of neighboring disciplines as well (Kapferer 2007). One possible merit to going native epistemologically is a new angle by which anthropology can critique the broader academy’s reliance on positivism.

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becomes a connective network; between certain humans and God, between those humans and others, between those humans and God and the anthropologist. But the question remains: is epistemological transformation possible—or even desirable—for an anthropology that seeks to know, but remain detached from, the religious other (cf. Asad 1993, 191-193)?

**Going Native with the Repugnant Other**

It is my contention that a detached and secular analytical method is appealing to anthropologists of religion (or at least of Christianity) because religious attachment threatens to destabilize the epistemological foundations of the discipline. This is particularly clear in consideration of anthropology’s enduring struggle with the religious commitments of its authors. Conservative Christianity is anthropology’s infamous “repugnant other” (Harding 1991); and despite—or perhaps because of—the now well-documented genealogical relationship between Christianity and anthropology (Cannell 2005; Larsen and King 2018), the idea of an explicitly Christian anthropology remains repugnant (e.g. Bialecki’s [2018] riposte to Meneses, et. al. [2014]; see also Merz and Merz 2017) in a way that, for example, a committed feminist or Marxist anthropology does not (Howell 2007). Perhaps unlike other situated standpoints to which anthropologists might adhere, religious commitment poses a threat to anthropology beyond research focus or agenda. Anglo-Catholicism, at least, actually challenges the basis of what its anthropologists take as knowledge.

Anthropology certainly supports the idea that the anthropologist is a participant in her informants’ lives, rather than her informants being mere players in an academic thought-piece. But the idea of the anthropologist of religion converting to—being so transformed by—the studied religion is reprehensible. Harding (1987, 171) describes religious conversion as “going native;” an anthropological “fetish” that is, per Ewing (1994, 571), strictly “taboo.” Here, “native” is a structural position à la Abu-Lughod (1991); the “other” to the anthropologist’s “self.” Used as such, the factor of difference is an analytical one between subject and researcher, not identity-based as between West/rest or insider/outsider (cf. Jacobs-Huey 2002). Following Harding and Ewing, the expression to “go native” is used in ethnographic accounts of religion to refer to conversion on the part of the anthropologist, more basically a personal transformation resulting from the acquired religious knowledge. Theological transformation on the part of the anthropologist is taboo not because of personal identity, but because the conversion is ultimately epistemological, and thus challenges the anthropological project.

Situating this theoretical concern in ethnography, the Eucharistic theology of Anglo-Catholics becomes problematic for anthropology when practitioners impose their relational, transformative epistemology on the researcher. Julian’s statement to me—that I know the Eucharist because I receive it daily, that I know something about Anglo-Catholics because I have been baptized—is important not just because it elicits something about the Anglo-Catholic worldview, but because it makes an assertion about what anthropology does and should do, what anthropology knows and can know. Reflecting an experience similar to my own, Susan Harding (1987, 171) describes that her Christian fundamentalist interlocutors were unimpressed by her claims to be “gathering information” in order to write a book. Instead, they located her within their world as “a lost soul on the brink of salvation.” Harding “on the brink” and my writing being overtaken by the Spirit are examples of what Wagner (1981, 31) calls “reverse anthropology.” Wagner wrote specifically about Melanesian cargo cults, describing that practitioners literalize etc (here, modern and Western) metaphors and produce a “pragmatic” (practical, useful) anthropology that “invents in anticipation of the future” (ibid., 32-33). Particular millennialist theology of cargo cults aside, this statement meshes well with the “reverse anthropology” employed by Julian, who adapts my project for pragmatic or practical use as a means to transmit Eucharistic theology. There is considerable discomfort in acquiescing to Julian’s proposition and an anthropology with an explicit religious standpoint; the premise that the religious commits something about the Anglo-Catholic anthropologist that equates knowing the other with attachment to and transformation by that other.

Harding (2000, 60) describes the Holy Spirit’s power of “speech mimesis” to transform fundamentalist Christians and act through them to transform others. Haddon (2013), in turn, suggests this theological model of conversion for anthropology, asking what it might look like for anthropology to actually re-shape the lives of its writers and readers.

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Haddon considers the dilemma of transformation in his ethnographic account of Hare Krishna proselytizing, musing that his written account may in itself be a kind of proselytizing. In response to Haddon, Robbins (2013, 334) suggests that if the work of the anthropologist is to convey otherness, surely there is merit in the anthropologist becoming a “bona fide Hare Krishna missionary.” Recognizing the awkwardness of his suggestion, Robbins asks if the discomfit is because “there is more to deploying otherness critically than just offering one version of it wholesale, in its own terms” (ibid., 334). The fear of going native is that an anthropology which takes up “wholesale” each of its myriad religious others would cease to bear an epistemological standpoint of its own—would cease to be a detached self capable of differential comparison.

However, I argue that it is precisely the ossification of its epistemology that prevents anthropology from understanding its religious others as anything other than “others.” If religious knowledge—which, following Furani, is broadly about attachment and relationality—is only ever “other” to the academy which maintains critical detachment, then it is denied the opportunity to transform its anthropological students—in which case, it ceases to be the same theology it is for its adherents. Recall from the Anglo-Catholic Eucharist: something is known insofar as it is given; a gift must be received as well as given; and reception equates to transformation of the recipient by the giver. Members of Bouverie House know God because He gives Himself in the Eucharist, because they commit to receiving Him there, and because they are changed by the knowledge that they consume. If religious subjects can only obtain theological knowledge through an Augustinian epistemology of attachment, certainly the same applies to anthropologists of those religious subjects. Regarding Bouverie House, epistemological conversion may actually be an obligation of the anthropologist studying Anglo-Catholics. Here, the risk is not in going native, with the suspected dissolution of the discipline by virtue of it being subsumed into its religious others. If knowing is to become like what is known, then the risk is precisely in not going native. Refusing to be transformed by religious or ethnographic revelation is at best a rejection and loss of knowledge given, at worst the admission that there never was this knowledge to begin with. Instead, the anthropologist must consider her situatedness within—and inability to extract her analysis from—the epistemology of the ethnographic field.

In proposing “going native” on an epistemological register, I invoke certain parallels with “native” or “insider” anthropology (cf. Howell 2007). Following Abu-Lughod’s (1991, 468) assertion (and critique thereof) that the anthropologist is “a being who must stand apart from the other,” native anthropologists have problematized the necessity of difference between researcher and subject: in order to produce new anthropological knowledge (Tsuda 2015), preserve integrity of the data independent of its writer (Kanuha 2000; Jacobs-Huey 2002), or simply as an inevitability of studying what one’s “others” take for granted (Narayan 1993, 681). I find Kondo (1986) particularly useful in approaching the epistemological root of anthropological distance and difference. Kondo claims that the anthropological writing process has long been one of “distancing” the self (researcher) from the field in order to “reencounter the other ‘safely’”—in analysis, the researcher negotiates data without being affected by it (ibid., 82). Challenging this detachment, Kondo calls for acknowledgement of the “embeddedness” of anthropological knowledge in finite human relationships (ibid., 86). Here, the identity of researcher or scholar is itself a crucial nexus into which knowledge is embedded (Narayan 1993).

One method to utilize this embeddedness, as Abu-Lughod (1991, 472) suggests, is by a focus on “connections” between researchers and subjects, between field and academy. By tracing the historical linkages between Anglo-Catholicism and anthropology, and situating contemporary Anglo-Catholic Eucharistic theology against the practices of secular academia, I have attempted to adopt this connective method for anthropological accounts of religion. Given the unique historical connection between anthropology’s epistemological development and that of Anglo-Catholicism, it seems appropriate to grant contemporary Anglo-Catholics their due riposte to Tylorian secularism. That is to say, if anthropology’s secular grounding is to be reconsidered, perhaps the modern academy’s original critics have a solution to offer.

Conclusion: The Obligation of Transformative Knowledge

I return now to my conversation with Julian. Following Carrithers’ (2015) aforementioned program for appropriately detached anthropological analysis, I situate Julian in her social context, elaborate any opaque elements of her statements for my readers, and
form an argument about how Julian’s words result from or contribute to an Anglo-Catholic lifeworld. Julian was in her mid-twenties; she and her husband had been attending Bouverie House for a little over a year. Julian was a doctoral candidate in religious studies, and found comfort and support at Bouverie House as she wrestled with questions of faith and secular academics. Her exclamation was, in part, an expression of her own concerns; and the passion with which she spoke—actually beating her chest a few times when referring to the Holy Spirit—demonstrates the chaplaincy’s effect on her outlook. The priests of Bouverie House made statements like Julian’s regularly, confirming that the Holy Spirit speaks through written language even when the human author does not so realize. Julian expressed a typical Anglo-Catholic confidence in the power of divine presence to inhabit material forms. This is true not just of Scripture or doctoral dissertations—it is the import of the Eucharist. In her brief declaration, Julian presented the Eucharist as a means to convey transformative divine presence and as the ultimate source of knowledge.

Crucial to my argument (and, incidentally, to Carrithers’), I can produce the above analysis and write something valuable about what it means to be Anglo-Catholic without it mattering that I was there, that Julian was speaking to me. Put another way, with the right background information and suitably thick description on my part, any thoughtful reader could draw similarly valid conclusions from this vignette. However, following Robbins’ (2020) suggestion that engagement with theology enables the anthropologist to ask new and different questions, the claim I have been trying to make by this article is that there is more to say about Julian’s and my conversation. That “more,” like Peter’s description of the Eucharist, evades secular epistemology, but is profitably found in consideration of knowledge as gift exchange. Some of the claims I have made about my conversation with Julian stand alone as ethnographic data available to be parsed by any visitor to the text. But there is also knowledge in the encounter that cannot exist independent of its actors—both of them. It matters that Julian said these things, because Julian is Anglo-Catholic and therefore something of an authority on the subject. It also matters that Julian said these things to me—not to a random passer-by, not into a void of academic thought-pieces and online journal databases. My role is part of the data production, and in an Augustinian epistemology, the continued validity of the data depends on my active participation with it and with Julian.

As Augustine is both Furani’s anti-secular muse and the father of Anglo-Catholicism’s anti-rational epistemology, it is worth briefly mentioning his work here. Setting aside his rich theological contributions, I point to the structure of his (2006) Confessions, what may be considered an early work of theological anthropology. The first nine chapters are a vivid description of Augustine’s personal struggle with continence and commitment. The final four chapters are a deep exploration of time and memory. Though set in a single volume, the two halves are disparate in purpose. Augustine’s autobiographical account is a testimony of the conversion experience. In contrast, the theological treatise of the second half is intended exclusively for readers who are baptized Christians. Augustine (2006, 190) asks, “how do they know whether I speak the truth, since no man knows the things of a man but the spirit of a man that is in him?” Just as the unbaptized cannot receive the Eucharistic sacrament, Augustine felt that they could not receive—that is, could not understand—the knowledge of God he hoped to reveal.

Riffing Augustine, Rudolph Otto (1958, 8) issues a warning: any reader of The Idea of the Holy that “cannot recall any intrinsically religious feelings” or experience is “requested to read no further” because the ensuing discussion would be useless. I suspect that very few of Augustine’s or Otto’s contemporary readers have heeded the authors’ instructions. Augustine’s treatise on memory and Otto’s consideration of supernatural presence are, by virtue of having been recorded in discernible written language, knowledge products available for consumption by a variety of readers—whether or not a given reader has been baptized or lived a numinous experience. But what if we were to take Augustine and Otto seriously? The potential of adopting an Augustinian epistemology for anthropology is that it forces the anthropologist to take seriously the claim that she cannot know the religious other without maintaining some degree of attachment to, or even transformation by, that other.

To demonstrate this point, I offer two considerations of my conversation with Julian whose ethnographic revelation is contingent on my willingness to enter into a gift-exchange relationship. First, I had not asked Julian about the Eucharist, in fact had not really asked her anything. That her exclamation was about Christ’s spiritual presence and
the Eucharist, rather than actually addressing my claim, demonstrates that the knowledge revealed in the Eucharist (the Logos) transcends any and all forms of worldly knowledge—including her own life that would soon be reduced to a few lines in someone else’s (my) doctoral thesis. Rudolph Otto (1938, 19) argues that the “holy” is recognized in part by its “overpoweringness”—the sheer awe it produces, the total ontological domination of the moment, Julian’s words themselves do not convey any sense of this overpoweringness; the magnitude is demonstrated by the fact that she responded to a question that was not asked, that she dismissed general academic knowledge production as inconsequential in comparison to Eucharistic revelation. Julian has gifted me ethnographic knowledge that is contingent on our mutual presence in an encounter.

Second, Julian’s words to me are a gift that demands reciprocity. Her statement is a potlatch-like challenge. If I have gone to mass every day, if I have the Holy Spirit inside me, if I do actually know what the Eucharist is about—then I have been transformed by it and cannot escape the obligation to write about it. In telling me about the power of the Spirit in Baptism and Eucharist, Julian offers me knowledge about the importance of these concepts to Anglo-Catholics; but she offers this knowledge with the expectation that I will do something with it. In response, I hope to have transformed my ethnographic analysis according to the obligations of this religious knowledge premised on attachment.

Here, I reverse Carrithers’ four-step scholastic detachment. Whilst still primarily speaking of Anglo-Catholics in the third-person plural, I have emphasized connectivity (as per Abu-Lughod 1991) throughout my account; incorporating myself as an ethnographic actor, and as a member of the secular academy with whom Anglo-Catholics seek to engage and correct. I have avoided extensive qualificatory explanation (or Gellner’s “translation”) for non-Anglo-Catholic readers—which may, at times, make this account somewhat opaque, but allows greater focus on the transformative potential of certain theological premises and thus maintains the integrity of that theology for practitioners. Thus, the argument I have presented is less an analysis of Anglo-Catholic Eucharistic theology, as it is an analysis with that theology. Finally, the ideally detached ethnographer maintains a “disinterested” affect—not uncaring, but diligently avoiding affiliation or conflation with one’s informants. I hope to have maintained Carrithers’ scholastic integrity, and avoided mere apologetics (cf. Howell 2007, 372; Webster 2013, xx), by arguing on an epistemological register rather than adopting any specific dogmatic tenants. However, my interest should be apparent. This paper is a response to my interlocutor’s gift; in writing about the Anglo-Catholic Eucharist, I acknowledge an attachment to, and transformation by, the source of my ethnographic knowledge.

As the hau seeks to return to its source, I offer the Eucharist to the academy as epistemological ressourcement, honoring the historical connections between Anglo-Catholicism and anthropology’s secular grounding, and with hope for a new consideration of theological knowledge within ethnographic analysis. It is, I suspect, not for me to judge if I have fulfilled the obligations of gift exchange. Perhaps it is only the reader who can evaluate the success of my attempt to analyze the Anglo-Catholic Eucharist. Will not those who have ears, hear? Maybe some reader will recognize that voice of calm, will have felt the spinal shiver or metallic taste, will have momentarily forgotten the hospitable bed or been overcome by a sense of “dust and ashes.” Perhaps this reader will recognize the “third way” of knowing that Anglo-Catholics attribute to Eucharistic revelation and will understand the tremendous overpoweringness that this revelation imposes upon its recipients. Is that reader now related, transformed, obligated?

References


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